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The internationalisation  
of nonviolent resistance
the case of the BDS campaign
Marwan Darweish1 and Andrew Rigby2
Abstract
This paper seeks to identify some of the factors that can enhance the 
strength and influence of international civil society solidarity networks 
that mobilise around issues of concern. To this end, we focus on the Pales-
tinian-inspired Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign and 
examine the significant differences that exist between it and the global 
anti-apartheid movement from which the Palestinian initiative derived 
much of its inspiration and strategic thinking. 
Differences between the contemporary BDS campaign and the anti-apart-
heid movement of the 1970s and ’80s fall into three main categories: 
internal factors related to the organisational profile and membership of 
the anti-apartheid movement; ideational factors that influenced the level 
of legitimacy that movement enjoyed; and contextual factors particular 
to the socio-political and economic environment within which the an-
ti-apartheid movement found itself operating.
We conclude by emphasising the importance of the dynamic relationship 
between ‘internal’ popular resistance and the global solidarity movement 
that the anti-apartheid sanctions inspired. If the BDS movement is to 
exercise comparable leverage, it is imperative that unarmed resistance 
against the ongoing Israeli occupation remains buoyant both at local and 
international levels. 
1  Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University
2  Emeritus Professor of  Peace Studies, Coventry University
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Introduction
We live at a time when the internationalisation of conflict situations 
has become particularly pronounced. Wherever conflicts take place in 
the world, they can impact directly on the lives of people outside these 
areas either through the ways they are disseminated via media sources or 
sometimes through direct violence against civilians. Yet while violence 
exerts its reach beyond borders, there has also been a growth in the 
internationalisation of nonviolent resistance thanks to the growth of 
transnational networks which mobilise civil society actors in order to 
affect the outcome of particular conflicts.  Schock (2005:128) argues that 
these mechanisms are leveraged to ‘mobilize the withdrawal of support 
from opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks 
upon which opponents depend for power.’ 
This paper seeks to identify some of the factors that can enhance the 
vitality, scale, and strength of international civil society solidarity networks 
which mobilise around issues of concern. To this end, we focus on the 
Palestinian-inspired Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign; 
in particular, we examine the significant differences that exist between 
that campaign and the global anti-apartheid movement from which the 
Palestinian initiative derived much of its inspiration and strategic thinking.3 
We begin by setting out the context for our interest in the BDS movement 
and in the internationalisation both of conflict and of networks of solidarity 
that form around movements dedicated to nonviolent resistance.
The unfulfilled potentialities  
of Palestinian popular resistance
In 2015 we published the results of our study of unarmed Palestinian 
resistance to occupation. Our research project focused in particular on the 
dynamics of the popular and predominantly nonviolent struggle that had 
3  It is not our intention in this paper to enter into the debate about the 
appropriateness of using the term ‘apartheid’ to characterise fundamental 
features of Israeli society and its associated institutions. This issue has already 
been addressed by a number of authors, in particular Richard Falk (2017) and 
others such as Clarno (2017), Pappé (2015), Hanfi (2009), Davis (2003) and 
Bishara (2001).
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emerged in 2002 amidst the violence of the ‘second intifada’ in opposition 
to the construction of the Separation Wall (Darweish & Rigby 2015). 
This popular resistance had subsequently spread to challenge settlement 
expansion and land expropriation in other parts of the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (OPT) (Pearlman 2003, 2014; Andoni et al. 2004; 
Broning 2011; Hallward & Norman 2012; Norman 2014). At the outset 
of our research in 2011, we were excited at the apparent promise of the 
burgeoning civil resistance movement within the OPT and we witnessed 
Palestinians engaging in unarmed modes of struggle in order to stay on 
their land and defend their ways of life and property against the violence 
of the Israeli occupation.4 However, as our research proceeded, we began 
to uncover some unwelcome findings. Palestinian popular resistance 
actors had successfully coordinated demonstrations, protest actions, 
and legal work, imaginatively highlighting the barbarism of the ongoing 
Israeli occupation and its consequences, but we were concerned to note 
that they had failed to exercise any noticeable influence on Israeli opinion 
leaders or the Israeli public in general. It would appear that the bulk of 
Israel’s Jewish citizens continued to go about their daily lives apparently 
unaffected by what was happening a short distance away in the OPT. 
We were advised by our Israeli informants that Palestinian protest 
actions received limited media coverage and that there was evidence 
to show that, whenever there was any extended television coverage of 
such protests, people tended to switch channels. Furthermore, when 
everyday Israeli citizens did see footage of Palestinian protest actions, 
they tended to understand the scenes they witnessed in terms of familiar 
stereotypes. Protestors were viewed through conventional frames as 
stone-slinging, keffiyah-clad Palestinian youths attacking ‘our boys’, the 
Israeli conscripts.5 One of our informants offered a stark summary of 
the situation when he noted that ‘The Israeli public has no interest in 
ending the occupation. It has no direct effect on their lives. They are not 
occupied. The occupation is irrelevant to them.´6
4  See Qumsiyeh (2006) for an example of the optimism that characterised much 
of the popular resistance during the first decade of this century.
5  Interviews, Tel Aviv, 20 November, 2013.
6  Interview, Netanya, 22 November, 2013.
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As engaged academics committed to nonviolence as a means of 
change we felt we could not conclude our study on such a pessimistic 
note. We were looking for some ground for hope, which we found when 
we turned our attention to the ways in which the conflict was being 
internationalised. Whilst Palestinian unarmed resistance had largely 
failed to touch the Israeli public and its decision-makers, over the past 
decade a burgeoning movement of international solidarity has emerged 
in favour of ending the occupation and associated abuses of Palestinian 
human rights and civil liberties.7 
One of the prime drivers of this growth in international solidarity 
has been the lethal violence inflicted on the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip 
by Israel in a series of wars. For example, one interviewee told us that it 
was witnessing the horror of the Israeli Operation Protective Edge of July-
August 2014 which led to her involvement in different forms of Palestinian 
solidarity work in the UK.8 Of equal significance in the development of these 
international solidarity networks has been the advocacy work conducted by 
the thousands of concerned individuals and groups who have spent time in 
the OPT and witnessed first-hand the reality of the everyday violence and 
humiliation inflicted on Palestinians by Israeli soldiers and settlers (Clark 
2009). One of our interviewees became active after a pilgrimage visit to 
holy sites during which her tour guide gave her an insight into the harshness 
of the occupation.9 When witnesses like this share their stories with family, 
friends, and other networks, they play a vital part in internationalising the 
struggle for liberation from external occupation. 
7  This paper is part of an ongoing research project which explores the challenges 
faced by activists in the UK when they engage in everyday acts of solidarity with 
Palestinians and Israelis seeking a just peace. We conducted 26 semi-structured 
interviews during 2016 and 2017 with activists that support or are sympathetic to 
the BDS movement in the OPT; with peace activists in Israel; and with activists 
in the Palestinian solidarity movement in the UK, including Jewish activists and 
the largest British organisation Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JfJfP). We also 
built on the rich research interviews we conducted in 2011-2013 when we held 
5 focus groups and interviewed over 100 activists at local and national levels as 
well as key political figures in Palestine and Israel.
8  Personal communication, 15 July, 2016.
9  Personal communication, Birmingham, 6 June, 2017.
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 The importance of internationalising conflict 
In his study of the nonviolent liberation movement in West Papua, 
Jason MacLeod pointed to the fact that the continuing Indonesian 
occupation there was dependent less on the subservience of the West 
Papuan people than on external sources of power, including domestic 
support within Indonesia and the ongoing support offered by Indonesia’s 
allies within the international system. MacLeod endorsed Donald 
Horowitz’s observation that the outcomes of self-determination struggles 
are ‘determined largely by international politics, by the balance of 
interests and forces that extend beyond the state’ (Horowitz 2015: 
230). MacLeod’s insights into the significance of international solidarity 
networks in relation to struggles to resist occupation are directly relevant 
to the Palestinian case. He argues that
The capability of self-determination movements to create the conditions 
for change is more constrained and contingent on international 
solidarity networks than in anti-regime struggles. Such movements 
require more sophisticated transnational strategies and a dense network 
of ties between the resisting population and transnational allies … The 
role of an extensive and persistent transnational solidarity network is 
to constrain and disrupt the external sources of power upon which the 
opponent state is indirectly dependent (MacLeod 2015: 196).
Barca and Zunes (2009: 166) arrived at a similar conclusion in their 
study of the struggle for self-determination by the people of Western 
Sahara. They noted that Morocco has been able to persist in its defiance 
of its legal international humanitarian obligation to the Sahrawis largely 
because of the support it receives from France and the United States. Barca 
and Zunes argue that, whilst it remains vital that a strong nonviolent 
movement persists amongst the Sahrawi people, the Sahrawi also need 
active support and solidarity from networks of citizens in France, 
the United States, and other countries if any sustainable challenge to 
Morocco’s ongoing occupation is to be realised. 
Like the West Papuans and the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara, 
Palestinians face a struggle which involves them seeking to liberate 
themselves from an occupation characterised by a huge asymmetry 
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of power. It is this stark imbalance of power that makes the role of 
international networks of solidarity so critical. Said (2000: 186) argued 
that if sufficient numbers of people around the world were to act together 
as ‘communities of conscience’ in relation to the Palestinian case, they 
could exercise sufficient leverage on their own political leaders and the 
policy-makers and communities within Israel to effect a change in the 
balance of power and hence in the trajectory of this ongoing conflict.
It follows from this analysis that the strategic challenge for 
Palestinians is how to widen and strengthen the web of external support 
and solidarity they generate to such an extent that Israeli decision-makers 
feel the pressure to address the core issues that drive this conflict. In 
order to achieve this outcome, it is important that activists on the ground 
understand a key dynamic in this internationalisation process, one that 
has been characterised by Keck and Sikkink as a ‘boomerang pattern’ 
(Keck and Sikkink 1999: 89-101). 
Conflict internationalisation  
and the boomerang process
The boomerang process refers to patterns that occur when local 
movements, such as the Palestinian popular resistance movement in the 
OPT, seek to enhance their leverage by trying to involve wider networks of 
external actors and agencies. In a process that is analogous to the flight of 
a boomerang, external sources of support are used to generate increasing 
international pressure on the Israeli public and its policymakers. As Keck 
and Sikkink (1999: 93) explain,  
Where governments are unresponsive to groups whose claims may 
none the less resonate elsewhere, international contacts can ‘amplify’ 
the demands of domestic groups, pry open space for new issues, and 
then echo these demands back into the domestic arena.
Most boomerang-throwers operate on a model which tries to 
mobilise ‘links in the chain of influence’, and so their approach makes 
use of what Johan Galtung (1989: 19) referred to as ‘the great chain of 
nonviolence’: the message of nonviolent activists is communicated from 
group to group, layer to layer, until it reaches the nucleus of the political 
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structure that is being challenged. In the case of Palestinian popular 
resistance, the message is communicated beyond the borders of Israel/
Palestine through local activists’ contacts with networks of grassroots 
supporters in other countries to create transnational networks. These local 
activists are in the position to present authoritative eye-witness accounts 
of human rights violations and thus ‘feed’ their networks with the kind of 
stories and case material that can be used to move decision-makers higher 
up the vertical ladder of influence within their respective countries. 
Typically, activists seek to frame the Palestinian issue in the language 
of universal human rights, and through such re-framing initiatives they 
can introduce people from key groups and constituencies to new ways of 
seeing the nature of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians 
(Landy 2013: 424). Instead of being portrayed as a ‘victim’ threatened by 
‘Palestinian terror’, Israel can be represented as an occupying power that 
routinely and mundanely abuses the basic rights of Palestinians who are 
subjected to the daily violence of occupation. When people are offered 
new lenses through which to view the conflict, old perceptions and 
customary wisdom which situate Israel as a victim defending itself from 
Palestinian and Arab terror can be broken down. 
The force of the boomerang effect depends to a large extent on 
the range and authority of the actors it draws into a conflict’s sphere 
of influence. Howard Clark (2009: 15) has noted that ‘In its flight 
the boomerang might pass through NGOs and activist constituencies, 
media, government departments and intergovernmental institutions 
before returning to make a difference at the point from where it was 
thrown.’ The significance of this kind of process was brought home to us 
by one Palestinian activist from Bethlehem who told us of his experience 
whilst on a speaking tour in Sweden: ‘At one place a pro-Israeli member 
of the audience raised a point, and before I could answer, someone else in 
the audience rebutted him. Without the internationals we would be like 
one hand clapping – they are the other hand that we need.’10
10  Interview, Bethlehem, 12 November, 2013.
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The BDS campaign: internationalising the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict
The most significant boomerang-throwing exercise undertaken 
by Palestinian civil society in recent years emerged out of a meeting of 
Palestinian civil society organisations in July 2005 after which a call 
was issued for a worldwide boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) 
campaign against Israel. The campaign that has been waged since then is 
based on the simple premise that Israel must pay a price for its continued 
occupation, its disregard for international humanitarian law, and its 
refusal to implement UN resolutions. The BDS campaign has gone from 
strength to strength in the years since its launch. Its core demands include 
the end of Israel’s occupation of Arab land, recognition of the rights of 
the Palestinian citizens of Israel, and acknowledgement of the right of 
the Palestinians to return according to UN resolution 194 (Bakan and 
Abu-Laban 2009).
One of the BDS campaign’s founders has recalled how they drew 
inspiration from the example of the anti-apartheid struggle in South 
Africa:
It was one year after the advisory opinion of the International Court 
of Justice regarding Israel’s construction of the apartheid wall in the 
occupied West Bank. There was a lot of discussion among Palestinian 
civil society organizations and others in Palestinian society about how 
we can give the solidarity movement a solid tool with a clear vision 
based on a deep analysis of the conflict between Palestine and the 
Israelis. We found the experience of South Africa very inspiring. So 
there was the opinion of following that experience of the people of 
South Africa. Especially because the governments at that time were far 
away from putting any kind of pressure on Israel.11 
The significance of the South African example was reflected in the 
11  Adnan Ramadan, quoted in ‘Boycott movement has empowered Palestinians, 
says co-founder’, The Electronic Intifada, 20 March, 2014, http://tinyurl.com/
ycpxlx5g (Accessed 5 September, 2017)
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original appeal for people of conscience worldwide to ‘impose broad 
boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to 
those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era’ (Bargouthi 2014). 
Furthermore, from the earliest days, BDS activists have presented their 
cause through the frame of an anti-apartheid struggle.12 To quote one of 
their leading figures: 
We are seeking to resemble the South African movement with mass 
support – the ‘South African moment’ is approaching but we are not 
there yet. Israel is increasingly isolated at the grass-roots level, not at 
the governmental level. Israel has dropped its thin mask of democracy 
and revealed itself as a regime of occupation, settler-colonialism and 
apartheid with its massive range of racist laws.13
The BDS campaign was inspired by and modelled on aspects of the 
worldwide anti-apartheid movement of the 1970s and ’80s, and it would 
seem that the success of the South African freedom struggle has also 
served as a source of hope for Palestinian activists and their international 
solidarity networks. It offers activists confidence in the possibility that 
global pressure can work effectively as it did in the case of the freedom 
struggle in South Africa, and it helps persuade them that the model 
employed there can be used to similar effect in the case of Palestine. 
The transnational movement against apartheid
In June 1959 a group of South African exiles in the UK and their 
British supporters launched an appeal for an international boycott of 
South African products. Calling themselves the Boycott Movement, they 
organised a boycott month in the UK in March 1960. Thousands of 
supporters distributed leaflets urging shoppers not to buy South African 
12  In December 2009, the campaign received the endorsement of leading 
Palestinian Christians with the publication of the Kairos Palestine Document. 
Once again, much of the inspiration for this initiative came from the South 
African struggle. (Interview, Bethlehem, 3 December, 2016.)
13  Interview, Ramallah, 30 November, 2016.
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goods. According to some sources, this was the biggest anti-apartheid 
protest in the UK until the mass actions of the Anti-Apartheid Movement 
(AAM) of the 1980s.14 
Throughout the 1960s and ’70s, the AAM in the UK campaigned 
for broader sanctions against South Africa, extending their demands to 
encompass the country’s isolation in sport, the arts, and academia. In 
June 1970, the first major success of this campaign was achieved with the 
cancellation of a planned South African cricket tour.
In the mid-1980s, the South African townships erupted, and this 
led to a new wave of intensive repression from the apartheid regime. 
Capitalising on growing international concern at the continuing clashes 
in South Africa, the AAM in the UK expanded into a broad coalition of 
students, trade unions, churches, political parties, and local groups and 
campaigns that demanded an end to British collaboration with apartheid. 
It was during this period also that concern started to grow amongst 
large sectors of the population in the US. Peter Schraeder (1994: 232) 
observed that 
As the violence in South Africa continued to intensify, rising popular 
demands for the US government to ‘do something’ to stop the unfolding 
tragedy in South Africa galvanized the anti-apartheid activities of 
African-American lobbying groups, Republican splinter groups, and 
grassroots anti-apartheid organizations. These groups, in turn, placed 
pressure on vote conscious congress-persons that recognized the 
popular political backlash that would accompany defeat of some sort 
of sanctions package.
Much of the protest in the US was directed at President Reagan’s 
administration which was pursuing what he termed a policy of 
‘constructive engagement’ with Pretoria, a stance which others saw as 
appeasement. However, in response to public pressure, Congress passed 
the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in 1986. This marked a 
watershed in US-South African relations insofar as it instituted significant 
14  Anti-Apartheid Movement, ‘The Boycott movement’, http://aamarchives.org/
history/boycott-movement.html (Accessed 7 September, 2017).
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economic sanctions designed to push the South African regime to 
dismantle its segregationist policies and practices. 
This milestone piece of legislation contributed to the solidification 
of pressure on South Africa from the broader international community, 
as evidenced by the UN Security Council vote of 1987 which imposed 
international sanctions on the regime. All but the most intransigent 
advocates of apartheid now saw that the regime could not survive such 
sustained pressure without significant reform. It was this realisation that 
led to F. W. De Klerk replacing P. W. Botha as leader of South Africa’s 
National Party after the September 1989 elections and promising to 
herald in an era of change and power-sharing between whites and blacks. 
A year later, Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners were released. 
In 1992, De Klerk repealed the apartheid laws while multi-party talks 
continued, and international sanctions were lifted. In 1994, Nelson 
Mandela became president after the country’s first democratic elections 
(Valley 2015).
Comparing the AAM and BDS
The aim of this section of the paper is to examine the conditions that 
contributed to the growth of the transnational anti-apartheid movement. 
This exercise will help us identify some of the challenges and opportunities 
that the Palestinian BDS movement encounters in its efforts to achieve 
a similar level of influence in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The analysis here will, more generally, help to highlight those factors 
that impact on the growth and effectiveness of international civil society 
solidarity networks wherever in the world they operate.
The conditions and factors considered relevant here can be grouped 
into three categories: 
•  Internal – those factors relating to the organisational profile and 
membership of the anti-apartheid movement. 
•  Ideational – those factors that influenced the level of legitima-
cy enjoyed by the anti-apartheid movement and the frame within 
which its role and purpose were perceived by third parties and in-
terested stake-holders.
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•  Contextual – those factors particular to the socio-political and 
economic environment within which the anti-apartheid movement 
found itself operating.
Internal 
The global anti-apartheid movement took its lead from the African 
National Congress (ANC) which was recognised as embodying the 
unified and legitimate leadership of the liberation struggle in South 
Africa. In the Palestinian case, the Palestine Liberation Organisation and 
the Palestine National Council have exercised a leadership function, but 
since the Oslo Agreement and the establishment of the Palestine National 
Authority (PNA) there has been no effective leadership to provide 
direction and coherence to wider networks of support and solidarity. 
The ongoing division between Fatah and Hamas remains a significant 
handicap despite several attempts at ‘reconciliation’ over the past decade 
and talk of establishing a unity government. The lack of leadership has 
had a debilitating effect on international solidarity networks. This view 
was articulated very clearly in our interviews by a UK-based activist who 
was deeply involved in anti-apartheid campaigns and had more recently 
been involved in supporting Palestinian human rights:
One of the differences between the work for South Africa and for 
Palestine is that with South Africa there was a very clear focus. The 
ANC was the main movement directing the activists inside South 
Africa but also had a very clear message it was directing to its supporters 
in different parts of the world … so we knew what we were being 
asked to do. That was very clear. The difference with Palestine is the 
fragmentation in everything.15 
The existence of a unified leadership in the form of the ANC meant 
that the aim of the anti-apartheid movement was reasonably clear and 
unambiguous: it promised a free democratic political system that would 
lead to the end of white minority rule in South Africa. The absence of 
any such leadership within the Palestinian political domain has helped 
create a diverse range of opinions within and about the role of Palestinian 
15  Interview, Coventry, 20 October, 2014.
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solidarity networks around the world. The BDS movement in the OPT 
reflects the voice of the majority of civil society organisations and ‘left-ist’ 
political groupings, but the dominant political forces of Fatah and Hamas 
have both refrained from endorsing the movement. The PNA and Fatah 
have shown limited support for a boycott of settlement products (Kayali 
2016: 182), but according to one of our interviewees – a Fatah activist 
from Bethlehem – there is only limited awareness of the BDS campaign 
amongst party activists. He told us that ‘at the Fatah conference this year, 
I wore a big BDS badge – and people from the conference were asking 
me, “What is BDS?”’16 
One of the major consequences of the lack of unified leadership 
has been the absence of a clear vision for the future beyond ending 
the occupation, and this has undoubtedly weakened the international 
solidarity network. One interviewee, who had been active in the anti-
apartheid movement in the UK, explained to us the dilemma he 
experienced in relation to the BDS call to boycott Israeli products:
Settlement goods is easy politics and no question that they should 
be banned as an economic means of undermining the settlements. 
But regarding boycotting Israel – Israel is a legitimate state by all the 
normal, accepted international criteria and therefore has the right to 
sell its own products. Moreover, it is not clear whether Palestinians are 
united in favour of such a boycott, in the way that the ANC was. There 
is no Palestinian equivalent of the ANC, and it is not clear what the 
stance is.17  
In the AAM, the vision was ‘one person one vote’, a slogan that 
united activists inside and outside South Africa who envisaged a future 
society and state based on equal civil and political rights for all its citizens. 
By contrast, the BDS movement has failed to present an inclusive vision 
than can be shared by Israeli Jews. As early as 1930, the ANC ‘aimed to 
take over and transform the existing state rather than to create their own 
institutions and state structures’; the Palestine- Oslo agreement, which 
sought precisely to create its own structures and institutions, represented 
16  Interview, Bethlehem, 4 December, 2016
17  Interview, Coventry, 13 March, 2017.
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a complete contrast to this approach (Greenstein 2015: 38).
Even as informed and engaged an observer as the veteran Israeli 
‘peace-nik’ Uri Avneri has expressed his confusion regarding the stance 
of the BDS leadership with regard to their vision of the type of peace 
settlement they support. 
I believe in peace. Peace means agreement between two (or more) sides 
to live in peace. Israeli-Palestinian peace means that the State of Israel 
and the Palestinian national movement come to terms with each other. 
Peace between Israel and Palestine presupposes that the State of Israel 
does exist, side by side with the State of Palestine. I am not quite sure 
that this is the aim of the BDS movement. Much of what it does and 
says could lead to the conclusion that it wants a peace without Israel 
(Avneri 2017). 18
Ideational challenges
Throughout the period when the anti-apartheid movement was 
active, the protagonists on either side were involved in what can be 
characterised as a framing contest, each seeking to present their target in 
as unsavoury and damaging a light as possible (Caragee & Roefs 2006). 
The AAM emerged victorious in this contest, and a number of features of 
their framing appear to have been significant.
i. A clear morality tale was established
The South African government tried to taint the ANC and its 
supporters as part of an international communist conspiracy that 
threatened the stability of the whole southern region of the African 
continent.19 In its turn, the AAM portrayed the South African regime as 
a privileged white minority dominating and exploiting a black majority 
which was denied the most basic of human rights. Over time, the AAM’s 
18  U. Avneri, ‘Despair of despair’, 16 September, 2017, http://tinyurl.com/
ycf8p397 (Accessed 26 October, 2017).
19  There were communists in key positions within the ANC, but all remained 
committed to the Freedom Charter that had been adopted in June 1955 and 
which remained the guiding document of the ANC and its supporters right up 
until the drawing up of the new constitution.
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portrayal of the apartheid regime took on the character of a morality 
tale with clear distinctions between good versus evil actors, and this 
unambiguous narrative resonated strongly with wide swathes of people 
around the globe.
By contrast, and particularly for Europeans and people from 
European backgrounds, the target of the BDS movement appears to be 
a significant section of the Jewish people – those living in Israel - and 
the Jews historically have been a vulnerable and persecuted minority 
in relation to which Europe carries considerable historical guilt. As a 
consequence the transnational Palestine solidarity movement does not 
yet have recourse to a morality tale with the same kind of framing power 
as that presented and reproduced by the AAM in its efforts to mobilise 
support around the world.
 ii. Resisting attempts to undermine the legitimacy of solidarity 
activists
Part of the framing contest that was central to the political struggle 
over South Africa was the attempt by the South African regime to portray 
the ANC’s members as violent extremists whose struggle for political 
power would be a prelude to a bloodbath with white South Africans as 
the victims. Whatever salience such a narrative might have had, it was 
eventually overwhelmed by a counter-narrative which suggested that the 
only way to avoid a bloodbath was through the holding of free non-
racial elections that held the promise of ending rule by a racist minority 
regime. This counter-narrative prevailed partly because people of all 
political persuasions could show their commitment to human rights by 
supporting its call for free non-racial elections in South Africa; those who 
supported the regime’s alternative narrative risked being castigated as 
racist.
Unfortunately, activists involved in the Palestinian international 
solidarity movement in general and the BDS campaign in particular 
remain vulnerable to ‘demonising tactics’ that can undermine the 
saliency of their campaign work (Khalidi 2017). One of the most 
powerful accusations aimed at them has been that of anti-Semitism, a 
charge that is used repeatedly to delegitimise criticisms of Israel from 
any quarter. The accusation acts as a particularly powerful deterrent in 
Europe and North America where it helps to keep people from openly 
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expressing their support for the Palestinians. As Norman Solomon (cited 
in Corrigan 2009) explains, ‘The failure to make a distinction between 
anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel routinely stifles public debate.’20 
The efforts of the Israeli government and its supporters around the 
world to conflate criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism has had some 
significant successes. In the US, some states have passed legislation that 
targets organisations that endorse the BDS campaign, and in the UK the 
government’s formal definition of anti-Semitism includes ‘the targeting 
of the state of Israel’ as one of its manifestations (Sedley 2017). The 
conflation of anti-Semitism and criticism of Israeli policy has not gone 
unquestioned. The influential gender and cultural studies critic Judith 
Butler – a member of the US-based Advisory Board of Jewish Voice for 
Peace – argues that ‘if the charge of anti-Semitism becomes a tactic to 
supress open criticism and debate on the State of Israel, its practices of 
dispossession and occupation, its founding and the ongoing implications 
of that founding for Palestinians, then it will lose its claim of truth’ 
(Butler 2017: viii).  Butler argues that the charge of anti-Semitism is used 
to censor or quell public debate and criticism of Israel in order to rule out 
certain unpalatable perspectives. 
 iii. Sporting boycott
The sporting boycott was one AAM strategy that proved to be 
particularly prominent and effective in highlighting the essential racism 
that defined apartheid. South Africa was excluded from the 1964 and 
1968 Olympics and expelled from the International Olympic Movement 
in 1972 following widely publicised protests in the UK against the 
tour of the all-white South African cricket team in 1970. This sporting 
isolation had a profound impact on white South Africans, forcing them 
to acknowledge the degree to which they were being portrayed as racist 
pariahs to significant sections of the world’s population. 
Calls by BDS campaigners for a total boycott of Israel, including 
a cultural, sporting, and academic boycott have caused a quite different 
response, generating a degree of disquiet amongst many who would 
20  Cited in Corrigan, E. 2009. ‘Is Anti-Zionism Anti-Semitic? Jewish Critics 
Speak.’ Middle East Policy Journal 16(4). Accessible at http://www.mepc.org/
anti-zionism-anti-semitic-jewish-critics-speak  (23 September 2017)
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consider themselves advocates of a just peace between Israel and Palestine. 
More than one Israeli peace activist with whom we discussed the pros 
and cons of a total boycott of Israel expressed their reservations, and a 
close friend expressed the view that such a boycott would leave dissident 
Israelis like himself increasingly isolated and weak.21 Another felt that a 
total boycott would be counter-productive as it would raise fears fed by 
Jewish collective memory of past boycotts driven by antisemitism rather 
than a commitment to basic human rights.22 
Such reservations expressed by Israeli peace activists bear out research 
on the response of targeted states to the imposition of sanctions. One of 
the most significant findings to emerge is that the targeting of sanctions 
against a regime that enjoys a significant degree of legitimacy can be used 
by the ruling elite to rally domestic support for its policies in the face of 
what are presented as external threats emanating from a common enemy 
(Grauvogel & von Soest 2014, Lindsay 1986). In other words, sanctions 
– particularly when implemented by a source with which the targeted 
regime lacks deep relationships and which target a whole economy and/
or population – can create a siege mentality and thereby trigger a ‘rally-
round-the-flag’ effect (Allen 2005, Galtung 1967). This would seem to 
be the response of many Israelis towards the BDS campaign. As one of 
our sources explained:
We are driven by survival and suspicion of the rest of the world as 
being against us – so international pressure would be evidence that they 
are against us, they hate us. Not – they are trying to talk to us and we 
should listen. So – if you are seeking a political result, then it will not 
come from this kind of pressure.23  
Contextual factors
Determining the precise impact of international moves against 
apartheid is difficult, but perhaps the most significant effect was on the 
morale of black and white South Africans. Just as protest and struggle 
21  Interview, Haifa, 2 December, 2016.
22  Interview, Tel Aviv, 29 November, 2016.
23  Interview, Tel Aviv, 5 December, 2016.
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within South Africa energised external solidarity networks, so outside 
pressure encouraged internal opposition to apartheid, reassuring 
protestors that they were not alone. It also weakened the resolve of the 
white minority who, despite protestations to the contrary, had a deep 
fear of total international isolation and their abandonment by erstwhile 
friends such as the United States. As Alan Hirsch (1989: 75) insightfully 
observed, ‘The power of the US was never its ability to talk to Pretoria, 
and always its ability to stop talking.’
One factor that contributed to Washington’s eventual withdrawal 
of support from the apartheid regime was the realisation that South 
Africa’s strategic role as a bulwark against communism sweeping 
through the African continent in the 1980s was no longer significant. 
The anti-apartheid movement benefitted from global political shifts that 
disempowered its opponents. International shifts of this kind have been 
much less favourable for the Palestinian solidarity movement. Islamic 
Jihadism has replaced communism in the view of the US and other states 
as the major threat to the status quo, and Israel has sought to portray 
itself as an important bulwark against this threat.
The AAM’s ability to benefit from geopolitical shifts was, of course, 
accelerated by pressure from grassroots groups. Up until the 1980s, 
the USA lagged behind Europe in mobilising around apartheid, but 
during that decade pressure from below grew, driven by Black human 
rights groups, universities, churches, and trade unions campaigning for 
disinvestment, and these groups received sympathetic media coverage 
which reached its peak from 1984 to 1986. According to some analysts, 
one factor in this growth was the elevation into positions of influence of 
African-American politicians. Certainly, the parallels between the struggle 
for majority rule in South Africa and the Black civil rights movement in 
the USA were so clear that the campaign was able to draw on the language 
of the civil rights movement to mobilise people, reframing apartheid as 
a domestic civil rights issue (Solop 1990: 321). Palestinian solidarity 
activists have no comparable narrative resource upon which to draw. 
However, there have been attempts to make links and build alliances with 
other communities under oppression and facing similar marginalisation. 
For example, activists in the ‘Black Lives Matter’ campaign highlight 
similarities in the nature of the oppression and racism they face with 
MARWAN DARWEISH AND ANDREW RIGBY
 –THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE 
63
the experience of Palestinians living under occupation (Seidel 2016: 165; 
Bailey 2015).
Another factor that played a part in bringing South Africa to the 
negotiating table was the fact that the white minority in South Africa 
needed the Black majority as a workforce. Indeed, the Black trade unions 
under COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions – became a 
powerful instrument of resistance and a source of pressure that helped to 
dismantle apartheid from within (Greenstein 2015: 37). By contrast, the 
Israelis do not need the Palestinians as a workforce because they continue 
to import ‘guest workers’ from around the world as a ready replacement.
One of the most significant factors in the vulnerability of South 
Africa to external pressure was the economic and financial difficulties the 
state was facing before the international divestment campaign came to its 
peak in the mid-1980s. Calls for disinvestment had little impact during 
the years of South Africa’s economic growth through the 1960s and into 
the early 1970s but, by the mid-1970s, returns on investment had begun 
to fall. Consequently, decision-makers in key financial institutions were 
prepared to respond to the calls for disinvestment that grew during the 
1980s. As Kenneth Grundy (1991: 60) observed
 More than half the U.S. firms with direct investments in South Africa 
withdrew between 1984 and 1989. ... Although many European firms 
were also forced to disinvest (e.g., Barclays Bank) and to reconsider 
their involvement, the impact of the campaign to isolate South Africa 
was not nearly so compelling in Europe.
Pretoria was forced to rethink its policies. Prospects for economic 
growth were minimal and without growth there would be escalating 
protest and pressure from the townships with a consequent deepening of 
the socio-economic and political crisis. Rory Ewins argues that 
In the end the informal sanctions implemented by the international 
private sector – prompted by events within South Africa, and by popular 
and government anti-apartheid moves in the West – probably had the 
greatest impact of all international moves directed against apartheid.24 
24  R. Ewins, ‘International Moves Against Apartheid’, http://tinyurl.com/
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Unlike South Africa in the 1980s, Israel in the current decade 
remains in reasonable economic and financial health. Moreover, there 
is no indication that its prime international sponsor in Washington is 
questioning its preparedness to continue bank-rolling right-wing Israeli 
governments that make little pretence of their lack of interest in pursuing 
what the majority of the world would consider to be a substantive peace 
process. 25
Factors affecting the strength of transnational civil 
society solidarity networks
Whilst the review presented above highlights the severity of the 
challenges faced by the Palestinian BDS movement in its efforts to 
emulate the AAM, the differences between these movements and their 
contexts provide useful insights into the general set of factors that affect 
the strength of transnational solidarity networks in support of nonviolent 
resistance movements. In this concluding section, we set out a number of 
hypotheses about the factors that affect their success:
i. The vitality of related transnational solidarity networks will be 
enhanced in direct correlation with the extent to which a resistance movement 
has a united leadership that speaks with a clear voice and advocates a coherent 
strategy with a clear goal.
The ANC existed as a united and legitimate leadership focused on 
achieving an end to white minority rule in South Africa. Within South 
Africa the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was the internal 
manifestation of the ANC and the trade union movement, was able to 
organise and coordinate internal protest and resistance. By contrast, there 
has been no equivalent locus of authority within the Palestinian political 
domain since the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993. 
ii. Transnational solidarity networks will be energised by the internal 
resistance movement’s vibrant and committed use of unarmed means of 
protest.
pj73wyj (Accessed 7 August, 2014).
25  See P. Speakman, ‘Netanyahu’s party platform “flatly rejects” establishment of 
Palestinian state‘, Mondoweiss, 3 November, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/mxxtrwc 
( Accessed 27 August, 2014).
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In the South African struggle, a dynamic interplay developed 
between the ANC and the United Democratic Front (UDF), its partner 
movement within the country. Mass protests and strikes imposed a 
heavy economic and financial cost on the regime and helped to energise 
social movements in key countries, especially the US, which became key 
players. These movements actively encouraged people to support the 
economic and cultural boycott of South Africa, pressuring corporations 
and financial institutions to disinvest from South Africa and urging their 
governments to impose sanctions on the minority white regime. By 
contrast, popular resistance within the OPT has been episodic apart from 
during the period of the first intifada. The internal resistance movement 
has not therefore provided the consistent and ongoing stimuli that would 
drive and inspire international solidarity activist networks. 
iii. The strength of an international network depends on the extent to 
which a conflict can be framed as a simple, clear ‘morality tale’ that juxtaposes 
good and evil.
The South African apartheid regime underpinned a manifestly 
unjust system that was contrary to most moral codes. As a consequence, 
one did not need a degree in history or specialist geo-political knowledge 
to grasp that the regime required a drastic overhaul. By contrast, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is difficult to explain to lay-people: advocates 
will need a map to identify the territories and the borders over which the 
conflict has been fought and must offer a historical overview of the origins 
of the conflict before attempting to present a range of possible peace 
scenarios. In other words, there is a geo-political, historical, and moral 
complexity to the conflict that can make it problematic for campaigners 
to adopt the cause even before they seek to sway and mobilise third 
parties.
iv) The likelihood of appealing to potential constituencies of support 
and solidarity depends on a movement being able to establish itself as the 
morally superior underdog in an uneven power relationship.
One of the recurring motifs that runs through the history of 
resistance movements is the story of David and Goliath, the tale of a 
courageous underdog who challenges a seemingly more powerful 
opponent and relies on the righteousness of their cause and their courage 
to prevail. Israel has been particularly adept at using this narrative device 
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from the Jewish tradition to mobilise its global network of supporters; 
it makes the case that it is a small democratic country surrounded by 
a host of despotic regimes that threaten its very existence. Palestinian 
solidarity activists seek to present their own version of the David-Goliath 
relationship whenever they highlight the asymmetry between the arsenal 
of resources that sustains and deepens the occupation and their own 
reliance on unarmed forms of popular resistance.26
v) Unarmed forms of resistance have significantly more wide-ranging 
appeal to potential constituencies of support and solidarity than violent modes 
of struggle.
Chenoweth and Stephan are amongst the contemporary authors to 
emphasise this point. As they note, ‘a critical source of the success of 
nonviolent resistance is mass participation, which can erode or remove a 
regime’s main sources of power when the participants represent diverse 
sectors of society’ (Chenoweth & Stephan 2011: 30). Unarmed modes of 
resistance can highlight the morality tale of good versus evil and reinforce 
the David versus Goliath motif far more strongly than violent resistance. 
Unarmed resistance also creates fewer moral dilemmas for potential 
supporters who do not want to risk association with the human costs of 
injury and loss of life. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to identify those factors that can enhance 
the scope and leverage of international civil society networks mobilising 
in support of civil resistance movements struggling for human rights in 
different parts of the world. We approached this by means of a comparison 
between the global movement targeting apartheid in South Africa and the 
contemporary Palestinian BDS movement which has drawn inspiration 
from the anti-apartheid struggle.
26  The ubiquity of the David-Goliath motif can be illustrated by two brief 
examples. In 1987, Kent Robinson and W.I. Norsworthy entitled their study 
of the United States support of the Contras against the Sandinista regime in 
Nicaragua David against Goliath: Washington’s war against Nicaragua (London: 
Zed, 1987). In 2016, Paul Legg, writing in The Guardian, depicted the fight for 
self-determination by the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara as ‘a classic David 
and Goliath struggle’. (The Guardian, 6 June, 2016)
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Our focus on the significance of internationalising civil resistance 
struggles came about as a consequence of our growing awareness of the 
gross asymmetry in power-relations (Dudouet 2006, 2008; Nanetti 
2017) between the core parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in 
other struggles for liberation in other parts of the world such as West 
Papua and the Western Sahara. Our analysis has been driven by our 
particular concern for the future of Palestinians and Israeli Jews whose 
lives continue to be brutalised by the ongoing occupation. As co-authors 
we share the conviction that an end to the occupation and a sustainable 
peace are necessary for the health and well-being of both peoples – 
the occupied and the occupiers. Just as the Palestinians cannot begin 
to fulfil their potential as human beings without being liberated from 
occupation, so the Israelis must be liberated from their role as occupiers 
and oppressors if they are to realise their true humanity.
Our paper also reflects our shared belief that to despair for the 
future of Palestinians and Israelis is to betray the future. We have an 
obligation to search for grounds for hope and to identify a vision for the 
future based on equality. We share with our interviewees a commitment 
to transform the oppressive and violent structures in Israel and to dissolve 
power relations (Vinthagen 2015: 205) that obstruct the building of an 
equal society. In this spirit, we have emphasised the significant role that 
can be played by third parties – civil society networks and states – in 
affecting the outcome of liberation struggles. 
Like the founders of the BDS campaign, we have drawn inspiration 
from history. The impact of the global movement targeting apartheid in 
South Africa is a source of hope and validation for Palestinian nonviolent 
resistance activists. Yet, the example from South Africa bears a key lesson 
which must be borne in mind: at the heart of the struggle against the 
apartheid regime was the popular resistance campaign within South 
Africa which drove the global movement of solidarity and support. 
However pivotal a role might be played by transnational networks at the 
civil society and state levels in determining the outcome of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, their efforts can only be inspired and driven by 
the example of those Palestinians and Israelis who have the courage to 
commit themselves to the struggle for equal human rights for all those 
dwelling in the land between the river and the sea.
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